Internal Liquidity Management and Local Credit Provision

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^{*} These slides and associated remarks represent only the author's current opinions, not those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System.

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- We test for the effect of liquidity management on lending at the municipality level. Do banks pick "winners" and "losers"?
- We assess whether banks with different types of owners manage their internal liquidity in different ways.
- We can also test whether changes in liquidity management lead to heterogeneous real economic outcomes across municipalities.



- Calculate the net due to position for each locality for each bank and month.
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- Calculate the net due to position for each locality for each bank and month.
- Net due to $= \frac{\text{intrabank liabilities} \text{intrabank assets}}{2}$
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intrabank liabilities > intrabank assets

 \rightarrow locality is a **net borrower** within the banking organization

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- If net due to is positive for a given locality, then:

intrabank liabilities > intrabank assets \rightarrow locality is a **net borrower** within the banking organization

• If net due to is negative for a given locality, then:

intrabank liabilities < intrabank assets \rightarrow locality is a **net lender** within the banking organization

Data

Disaggregated locality-level banking data:

- Comprehensive balance sheet and income statement information for the universe of bank branches in Brazil.
- Aggregated across all branches for a single bank in a particular municipality.
- Available through the Central Bank of Brazil at a monthly frequency between 2011and 2014.

Consolidated banking data:

- Comprehensive balance sheet and income statement information for universe of [commercial banks, etc...] in Brazil.
- Data are available through the Central Bank of Brazil at a monthly frequency between 1994 and 2014.

Sample cut of data:

| Bank | Locality | Branches | Month | Year | Full Balance Sheet Data |
|-----------------|----------------|----------|-------|------|-------------------------|
| Banco do Brasil | Rio de Janeiro | 30 | 1 | 2012 | |
| Itau | Rio de Janeiro | 25 | 1 | 2012 | |
| Banco do Brasil | Sao Paolo | 45 | 1 | 2012 | |
| Bradesco | Sao Paolo | 32 | 1 | 2012 | |

Sample selection (size of bank and outliers)

• Time period: 2011Q1-2014Q4.

•

- Drop certain prominent banks: e.g., BNDES
- Drop observations where the aggregate net due to >1 percent total assets. One would expect these values to net out.
 - Other adjustment: Winsorize variables at the 1 and 99 percentiles.

Types of banks

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- **<u>Government-owned</u>**: 52% of sample assets, e.g., Banco do Brasil and Caixa Economic Federal.
 - Private domestic: 29% of sample assets, e.g., Banco Bradesco, Itau/Unibanco.
 - **Foreign-owned**: 19% of sample assets, e.g., HSBC Brasil, Santandar Brasil.

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Locality per capita GMP



Net Lender vs. Borrower locations of Bank of Brazil branches.



Raw data: Urbanization



Raw data: Income per capita



Raw data: Population



Private banks



Raw data: Concentration

Government banks





Raw data: Lending



- Private banks allocate internal liquidity to areas that are more urban, rich, populous, and to areas with less banking sector competition whereas government banks do not.
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Taper Tantrum and Brazilian Bank CDS





Methodology:

What is the effect of bank funding on internal funding flows to (and from) branches in a particular locality during a stress period?

 $y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Post_t + \beta_2 PostXForeignFunded_{ijt} + \delta_i + \theta_t + \epsilon_{ijt}$

where y_{ijt} is the net due to, for bank i, in locality t, in quarter t.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Net Due To | Net Due To | Net Due To | Net Due To | Net Due To | Net Due To |
| Post | 22.356^{*} | 29.698*** | | | | |
| | (10.855) | (6.778) | | | | |
| Foreign FundedXPost | -49.648** | | -82.927^{***} | | -89.027** | |
| | (20.242) | | (27.808) | | (36.244) | |
| Private BankXPost | | -62.322^{***} | | -89.068*** | | -97.863*** |
| | | (17.939) | | (23.392) | | (29.181) |
| R^2 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.90 |
| Ν | 103264 | 103264 | 103264 | 103264 | 103264 | 103264 |
| Fixed Effects: | | | | | | |
| Bank | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark |
| City | | | \checkmark | \checkmark | | |
| Quarter | \checkmark | \checkmark | | | | |
| Time | | | \checkmark | \checkmark | | |
| CityXTime | | | | | \checkmark | \checkmark |

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------|-----------------|
| | Net Due To | Net Due To | Net Due To | Net Due To | Net Due To | Net Due To |
| Post | -14.696 | 37.062*** | 36.980*** | | | |
| | (15.875) | (7.896) | (7.911) | | | |
| Headquarters | -521.909^{***} | -549.733*** | -557.644*** | -538.891*** | -561.586^{***} | -549.761*** |
| | (124.052) | (124.927) | (132.970) | (147.759) | (152.674) | (164.050) |
| HeadquartersXPost | -33.826 | -33.316 | -14.886 | 13.234 | 2.548 | -25.500 |
| | (31.599) | (26.847) | (35.967) | (56.195) | (54.103) | (46.012) |
| Private BankXPost | | -70.634^{***} | -70.520^{***} | | -97.718^{***} | -98.015^{***} |
| | | (18.430) | (18.548) | | (29.267) | (29.493) |
| Private BankXHeadquarters | | 145.186 | 161.989 | | 141.174 | 114.249 |
| | | (96.465) | (108.021) | | (121.053) | (145.667) |
| Private BankXHQRsXPost | | | -38.713 | | | 61.318 |
| | | | (53.685) | | | (127.526) |
| R^2 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.90 |
| N | 103264 | 103264 | 103264 | 103264 | 103264 | 103264 |
| Fixed Effects: | | | | | | |
| Bank | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark |
| City | ~ | ~ | ~ | | | |
| Quarter | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | | | |
| CityXTime | | | | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark |

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|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Ln(Lending) | Ln(Lending) | Ln(Lending) | Ln(Lending) | Ln(Lending) | Ln(Lending) |
| Post | -0.012 | -0.025 | -1.739 | -1.936 | -0.333 | -0.331 |
| | (0.038) | (0.029) | (874.303) | (855.795) | (325.213) | (322.503) |
| Net Due To | 1.659^{***} | 1.659^{***} | 1.417*** | 1.427*** | 1.497*** | 1.506*** |
| | (0.181) | (0.188) | (0.149) | (0.143) | (0.163) | (0.161) |
| PostXNet Due To | -0.058 | -0.088 | -0.067 | -0.085* | -0.097* | -0.108** |
| | (0.060) | (0.072) | (0.039) | (0.047) | (0.050) | (0.043) |
| PostXForeign Funded | 0.043 | | 0.079 | | 0.098 | |
| | (0.074) | | (0.078) | | (0.085) | |
| PostXPrivate Bank | | 0.096 | | 0.129 | | 0.154 |
| | | (0.084) | | (0.085) | | (0.093) |
| Net Due ToXForeign Funded | 0.301*** | | 0.271*** | | 0.262* | |
| | (0.079) | | (0.086) | | (0.140) | 0.00% |
| Net Due ToXPrivate Bank | | 0.274*** | | 0.240*** | | 0.225* |
| | 0.100 | (0.079) | 0.100+ | (0.076) | 0.00.00 | (0.124) |
| PostXNet Due ToXForeign Funded | 0.188 | | 0.189* | | 0.204** | |
| D (VN) D (E VD) (D) | (0.132) | 0.00=* | (0.107) | 0.051** | (0.095) | 0.000** |
| PostXNet Due ToXPrivate Bank | | 0.287* | | 0.271** | | 0.292** |
| | | (0.158) | | (0.121) | | (0.101) |
| N | 103118 | 103118 | 103118 | 103118 | 103118 | 103118 |
| Fixed Effects: | | | | | | |
| Bank | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark | \checkmark |
| City | | | \checkmark | \checkmark | | |
| Quarter | \checkmark | \checkmark | | | | |
| Time | | | \checkmark | \checkmark | | |
| CityXTime | | | | | \checkmark | \checkmark |

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- 2. Net due to positions increase during times of financial stress, but this increase is driven by domestically-funded banks, in other words, by banks that are relatively isolated from the stress.
- 3. Private banks shift their internal funds during a stress period to richer areas. Lastly, we find that internal liquidity management plays an important role for banks' ability to lend, especially for those exposed to financial stress.